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NOTES AND COMMENT
DECLARATIONS OF DEATH - A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
Introduction
At Lake Success, on April 6, 1950, an international conference,
convened by the United Nations,: established and opened for acces-
sion by states an international convention on the declaration of death
of missing persons.2
The Convention, though limited in scope, marks a first step
toward the solution, on an international basis, of a problem of con-
siderable complexity.
It seems that two considerations led to the recognition of the
necessity for an examination of the problem by international organ-
izations and for international action:
(a) During and after World War II the number of cases in
which declarations of death were helpful or necessary increased in an
unprecedented manner, and the proportion of cases of international
character increased even more;
(b) National laws differed fundamentally in their treatment of
the problem and as a result insurmountable difficulties were apt to
arise in cases involving an international element.
In order fully to understand and appreciate the significance of
the Convention it will be useful to proceed by considering these two
facts first.
I. World War II and the Increasing Number of Declarations
of Death
Declarations of death have always been considered an exceptional
and merely subsidiary method of legally ascertaining and establishing
a person's death. The death of a human being ordinarily occurs
under circumstances which enable other persons, and especially the
appropriate authorities, to establish death with logical and legal cer-
tainty, and thus to issue death certificates or other public documents
of a similar type, generally recognized as competent evidence of such
1 Official title: "United Nations Conference on Declaration of Death of
Missing Persons" (hereafter referred to as Conference).
2 "Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons" U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 1/9 (hereafter referred to as Convention).
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death.3 However, if no such public document can be issued, because
no one has identified the body of the alleged decedent, the circum-
stances of disappearance and the period of the absentee's unexplained
absence still may give rise to a presumption of his death.
In order to avoid the continuance of detrimental uncertainty,
necessity may arise in certain proceedings to obtain a declaration of
the absentee's presumed or certain death. Declaring a person dead
is an artificial act: the crossing out of a person's name from the
imaginary register of the living. And this is done in spite of the
fact that no one has testified to having seen him die, or to having
identified his body, so that there always remains some doubt, how-
ever slight, as to his being alive or dead.4  Hence, a declaration of
death is something that will, and should, be required very rarely
under normal circumstances.
In earlier times, and even one or two generations ago, declara-
tions of death were confined to the cases of supposed victims of
natural calamities such as earthquakes and floods, to passengers of
ships that failed to return," and to persons presumed to have perished
in a conflagration. 6 Thus, uncertainty about the death of a missing
person and the ensuing need for a declaration of death, was due
mostly to technical difficulties, e.g. the inadequacy of transportation,
the lack of a world-wide search system, and the shortcomings of
existing international postal and similar services.
While one might have thought that the need for declarations of
death would diminish with the development of modern techniques
and of civilization in general, such has not proved to be the case.
3 Davis v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, 165 N. Y. 159, 58 N. E.
891 (1900) ; Matter of Hall, 90 Misc. 216, 154 N. Y. 'Supp. 317 (Surr. Ct.
1915) ; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 374-a.
4 "He may not be dead, but he will be presumed to be dead for the purpose
of fixing the rights of those known to be living." Matter of Wagener, 143
App. Div. 286, 288, 128 N. Y. Supp. 164, 166 (1st Dep't 1911). Justice Holmes
delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court upholding the con-
stitutionality of a Massachusetts statute which limited the time in which a per-
son may recover his property after having been presumed dead, likewise refers
to the element of chance: "Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up,
but constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances,
and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be done." Blinn
v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1, 7 (1911).
5 See the opinion of Lord Mansfield concerning the case of a missing per-
son last heard of in 1778 on board a vessel which, sailing from the Cape of
Good Hope, ran into a heavy storm. Patterson v. Black, 29 E & E Dig. 388,
case 3092 (1780); 2 PARK'S MARINE INsuRANcEs 644 (7th ed. 1817) ; Hope-
well v. De Pinna, 2 Camp. N. P. 113, 22 E & E Dig. 164, case 1396 (1809);
Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass. 563 (1874).
6 It seems that modern medico-legal techniques of identification of human
bodies tend to eliminate in many cases the necessity for a declaration of death.
See Day and Thompson, Medico-Legal Identification of Disaster Victimns, 28
CAN. B. REv. 661 (1950). According to this report, out of the 108 victims of
the vessel "Noronic" destroyed by fire on Sept. 17, 1949, in Toronto Harbor,
Canada, all but three could be successfully identified, though most of the vic-
tims were burned beyond recognition.
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On the contrary, after World War II, declarations of death, formerly
an exceptional and extraordinary method of legal casework, have
become, in an unprecedented manner, the means by which the deaths
of millions of people are established and the legal relations and in-
terests of other millions ascertained.7 Responsible for this trend are
the total war with its air raids and mass killings and the fury of
totalitarian governments, which have often consigned their opponents
to the fate of concentration camps, mass deportation and mass ex-
termination.8
It has thus become a matter of common and tragic knowledge
that during World War II millions of human beings were killed by
mass bombings or were deported from their homes and exterminated
under circumstances making accurate identification difficult or im-
possible.9 As a result, after a period of patient waiting, those who
7 The MEMORANDUM OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE INTER-
NATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION (PCIRO) ON NEcESsITY OF COORDINATING
PRocEUREs FOR DEcLARATIONs OF DEATH, United Nations, Economic and So-
cial Council (ECOSOC), doc. E/824 (June 15, 1948), estimated the number
of people missing from European countries alone, excluding the U.S.S.R., at
8-12 million.
s Testifying in Nuremberg on April 15, 1946, the former commandant of
the extermination camp at Oswiecim (Auschwitz), Poland, Rudolf Franz Fer-
dinand Hoess, estimated with reference to that camp alone and only to the
period between May 1, 1940 and Dec. 1, 1943: ". . . that at least 2,500,000
victims were executed and exterminated there by gassing and burning, and at
least another half million succumbed to starvation and disease making a total
dead of about 3,000,000." 11 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREm-
BERG 359 (published by the British Stationery Office 1947). A German post-
war treatise estimates the number of concentration camp inmates in Germany
from 1933 to 1945 at 7,800,000. Of these an estimated 7,125,000 perished,
5,500,000 being killed in gas chambers or exterminated by similar methods,
while only about 700,000 are believed to have survived. KoGox, DER SS-STAAT,
DAS SYSTEM DER DEUTSCHEN KONZENTRATIONSLAGER 146 (2d ed. 1947). For
additional figures on missing persons from various European c6untries, see
FRAENKEL, MISSING PERSONS, THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
51-57 (1950). In Feb., 1949 the representative of the United States, dealing
with charges brought by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the
ECOSOC, had estimated the number of persons subjected to forced labor in
the U.S.S.R. at between eight and fourteen millions. (Proceedings of the
ECOSOC No. 236 at 15, Feb. 16, 1949). For a recent discussion of legal
problems involved in the system of concentration camps, see Brecht, The Ccn-
ce;;tration Camp, 50 COL. L. REv. 761 (1950). Statistical figures have been in-
cluded here because, as is generally known, concentration camps and similar
institutions are not only the customary means by which totalitarian regimes
dispose of their alleged enemies and one of many manifestations of their dis-
regard for elementary human rights, but unfortunately are also the locale of
mass "disappearance," and thus an inexhaustible reservoir of declaration of
death cases.
- 9 As a matter of simple logic there is no reason why the death of victims
of political prejudice in extermination camps should not have been established
and recorded in the usual way, those deaths having occurred under circum-
stances satisfying the normal requirements for death certificates, and even
under the control of authorities. However, experience in all countries that
have endured the ordeal of a totalitarian regime, goes to show that not only
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had vital legal relations 10 dependent upon the death of those millions
who were missing, instituted proceedings involving declarations of
death, in proportions almost amounting to a mass movement.
II. Differences between National Laws on Declaration of Death
Proceedings connected with declarations of death were frequently
hampered by manifold difficulties. These difficulties were largely
due to the divergent concepts of such declarations, prevailing in the
various legal systems.
1. The common law system. The common law does not recog-
nize any special procedure for a decision solely on the issue of death,
independent of other legal relations in issue. At common law the
presumption of death must be raised incidental to a pending proceed-
ing in which the absentee's death is one of the issues. 1 Whenever
it is important in any particular action or proceeding to ascertain
whether a person is dead or alive, this issue must be met and solved.
The means thereto is, in absence of adequate proof of his death, the
specific presumption that after seven years of unexplained absence a
person is no longer alive.12  However, the legal effect of this pre-
do these r6gimes tend to prevent any contact of the inmates of such camps with
their relatives, and the communication of any news about them while they are
alive, but they also fail to record their deaths and to inform the competent
authorities or close relatives when death has occurred. A similar problem is
created by the typical phenomenon of the special death registers that were kept
by some concentration camps, which, of course, have nothing to do with official
and regular death records as established by national legislations, but do, how-
ever, furnish some evidence of death. The problem becomes more difficult
whenever it, appears that obviously false entries were deliberately made in such
special records. The death ledger of the World War II concentration camp
of Mauthausen, Austria, for instance seems accurate at first sight; Volume 5,
pages 568-582 of these death records register on March 19, 1945, between
15 minutes past one A.M. and two o'clock P.M., the deaths of 203 persons all
due to "heart trouble." These deaths occurred one after another, at relatively
brief intervals, and in alphabetical order. 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGRESsioN
967 (published by the' Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel 'for Prosecution of
Axis Criminality, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946).
10 For, the problem of marriage in relation to declarations of death, see
Feit, The Enoch Arden: A Problem in the Family Law, 6 BROOxLYN L. Rxv.
423 (1937). For the treatment of declarations of death in Canon Law, see
Julien, Proof of Death of Cases Involving Military Personnel Killed or Miss-
hig as the Result of War Action, 6 THE JURIsT 1 (1946).11 U. S. Comments on Draft Convention on Declaration of Death of Missing
Persons, ECOSOC Doc. E/1071/Add. 3. 3-5 (Feb. 11, 1949).
12 On the whole, the courts do not consider the mere fact of a seven years'
absence sufficient to warrant the presumption of death. Something more is re-
quired: as a general rule a sincere and diligent search must have been insti-
tuted. In addition, some unusual facts, the circumstances of the disappearance
or some other circumstances, must often be proved in order "to justify the
inference that the death of the absentee is the probable reason why nothing is
known about him." Matter of Sullivan, 130 Misc. 501, 502, 224 N. Y. Supp.
442, 444 (Surr. Ct. 1927). New York courts tend towards a strict interpre-
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tation of this requirement, see, e.g., Cerf v. Diener, 210 N. Y. 156, 104 N. E.
126 (1914); Gall v. Gall, 236 App. Div. 338, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't
1932); Frankish v. Frankish, 206 App. Div. 301, 200 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1st
Dep't 1923); Matter of Morrisroe, 186 Misc. 146, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 585 (Surr.
Ct. 1945) ; Matter of Hoffman, 116 N. Y. L. J. 817, col. 4 (Surr. Ct. March 1,
1944) (missing husband attempted suicide before his departure and would be
75 years old if still alive) ; Matter of Crater, 171 Misc. 732, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 597
(Surr. Ct. 1939); Matter of Sciscenti, 157 Misc. 499, 283 N. Y. Supp. 960(Surr. Ct. 1935); Matter of Katz, 135 Misc. 861, 239 N. Y. Supp. 722 (Surr.
Ct. 1930); Matter of Meserole, 132 Misc. 259, 230 N. Y. Supp. 161 (Surr.
Ct. 1928) ; see also Glass v. Glass, note 5 mpra.
It would seem that in life insurance cases the courts are less rigid than
in decisions on dissolution of marriage and in probate proceedings. Still, in
order to establish the good faith of the plaintiff, a diligent search and inquiry
for the absentee is required. See, e.g., Butler v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
225 N. Y. 197, 121 N. E. 758 (1919); Connor v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 179
App. Div. 596, 166 N. Y. Supp. 985 (2d Dep't 1917); Circus v. Independent
Order Ahawas Israel, 55 App. Div. 534, 67 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1st Dep't 1900) ;
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S. v. Sieg, 74 F. 2d 606 (6th Cir.
1935); Fuller v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 199 Fed. 897 (3d Cir. 1912); Modern
Woodmen of America v. White, 70 Colo. 207, 199 Pac. 965 (1921); Kaminskas
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 129 Conn. 394, 28 A. 2d 847 (1942);
McNaghten et al. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 390, 48
N. E. 2d 200 (1943); Bridges v. Schenandoah Life Ins. Co., 209 N. C. 282,
183 S. E. 372 (1936); Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 109 Vt. 6,
192 Atl. 184 (1937). See THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 319-
325 (1898); 9 WIGaMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2531a (3d ed. 1940). Statutory rec-
ognition of the seven years' absence rule in New York: CIV. PRAC. ACT § 341;
cf. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 570-587; SUmROGATE'S COURT ACT §§ 119, 144. Dili-
gent inquiry need not be proved in Nebraska and Wisconsin. Banks v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co,, 142 Neb. 823, 8 N. W. 2d 185 (1943); Page v. Modern
Woodmen of America, 162 Wis. 259, 156 N. W. 137 (1916); Miller v. Sov-
ereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 140 Wis. 505, 122 N. W. 1126 (1909).
But cf. Hansen v. Central-Verein der Gegenseitigen Unterstuetzungs Gesell-
schaft Germania, 198 Wis. 140, 223 N. W. 571 (1929) (seven years' absence
not sufficient where insured was on unfriendly terms with family).
The establishing of a period of seven years has been deemed arbitrary.
9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §2531b (3d ed. 1940); 5 FORT. L. J. 280; 6 FORT.
L. J. 43 (1936). In some jurisdictions the period of absence of seven years
-itself deemed arbitrary-has arbitrarily been reduced to five years: e.g.,
Arkansas [ARK. DIG. STAT. §5120 (1937)] (for residents of Arkansas only);
Indiana [INn. STAT. ANN. §§6-401, 6-402, 7-419 (Baldwin 1934)] (for the
distribution of estates of residents only) ; New York (DoMEsTIc RELATIONS
LAW § 7-a) (for the dissolution of marriage). The Uniform Absence of Evi-
dence of Death and Absentee's Property Act which eliminates the seven-year
absence rule and substitutes as a criterion the individual circumstances of dis-
appearance, has been adopted by only three states: Maryland [MD. ANN. CODE
GEN. LAWS Art. 857, § 1536 (1941)]; Tennessee [TENN. CODE ANN. § 102
(Michie 1941)]; Wisconsin [Wis. STAT. §268, 22-34 (1943)]. The law of
Louisiana (CIVIL CODE ANN. Arts. 51-75) also fixes a period of five years'
absence. However, this law follows the French system discussed infra: the
presumntive heirs of an absentee may be granted provisional possession, which
after 30 years, ripens into absolute possession. The law of Louisiana (CIVIL
CODE §§ 936-939) also follows the intricate system of a scale of presumptions
of survival followed by the French law (French CODE CIVIL Arts. 720-722).
This was applied in the case of the Succession of Langles, 105 La. 39 (1900),
which concerned a 52-year-old mother and her 35-year-old daughter who per-
ished in the same shipwreck. Each had made a will in favor of the other. By
means of the specific presumptions of the Louisiana law where differences as
to sex and age are determinative of the artificial solutions of the questions of
[ VOL . 25
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sumption remains entirely restricted to the pending action or pro-
ceedings in which it is invoked.
2. The system of a special and final declaration of death. The
essential feature of such a system is the existence of special proceed-
ings under special rules of practice which have as their sole purpose
the attainment of a judicial decision of the declaration of death of a
missing person, based on unexplained absence for varying periods,
depending on the absentee's age and the kind of peril, if any, to which
the absentee was exposed at the time of his disappearance. This
period varies from country to country, and may also vary within a
particular country. It is most frequently three, five or ten years.13
The period is generally shorter if the missing person was very old or
if he was exposed to an enhanced danger.1 4  Under such a system
applications may be filed by any interested person, and decisions must
be preceded by periods of public notice. Once made, the decision,
though rebuttable, is valid for all purposes, and fixes the time up to
which the absentee is deemed to have lived and from which he is
deemed to be dead. It is a quasi-judicial substitute for a death cer-
tificate.
The main difference between this system and that of the common
law obviously lies in the fact that in common law jurisdictions some
particular proceedings must be initiated (e.g. for the dissolution of
marriage, or the distribution of an estate), and in them the death of
an absentee may be established as incident thereto. The effects are,
therefore, restricted to such proceedings, whereas, in the other
system just discussed, a declaration of death cannot be established
as an incident to other proceedings. Rather, special proceedings are
sequence of death, the daughter was held to have survived the mother. The
final act of the story is a rather unique tombstone in a New Orleans cemetery
bearing the inscription: "Angele Marie Langles-105 La. 39." See FRAExKEL,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 49, 78.
The so-called "doctrine of specific peril" applied in some common law jur-
isdictions is not a modification of the seven years' absence rule. It is rather
an application of circumstantial evidence to a case where there remains no
logical doubt that a person has died in "some clearly identified disaster."
Matter of Katz, 135 Misc. 861, 867, 239 N. Y. Supp. 722, 732 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
Under this doctrine it is not the unexplained disappearance of a person, but a
concrete and obvious danger which is responsible for the establishment of his
death. See Comment, Statutory Solutio of Uncertainty as to Fact and Time
of Death, 7 MD. L. Rav. 330 (1943).
13 Many countries (e.g., belligerent countries after both World War I and
II) enacted special statutes after events involving mass-disappearances, under
which missing persons could be declared dead by simplified proceedings and
after shortened periods of absence and of public notice [see, e.g., Hungary,
Government Order 28,000/1919. I.M. of Oct. 31, 1919, Government Order
12,200/1948, (1948) MAGYAR KozLo-.Y, No. 267]. The main purpose of such
rules was to avoid a protracted period of indecision regarding the fate of
marriages and estates in the great number of cases where disappearance in
war probably ended in death.
14 See VOGEL, VERSCHOLLENHEITSRECHT 15 (1949).
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required which have no other purpose than that of declaring a miss-
ing person dead, and once such a decision has been rendered, it can
be used for any purpose in any proceedings whatsoever. Thus, it
has the same legal effect as the person's death, or, as it is preferable
to say, it takes the place of a death certificate.
This latter system has been adopted 15 in Austria,'0 Czecho-
slovakia,17 Finland,' 8 Germany,'9 Greece,20 Hungary,21 Poland 22
Portugal,23 Rumania,24 Sweden,2 5 Yugoslavia, 2  and with some qual-
15 For English translations of European statutes, see EUROPEAN LEGISLATION
ON DECLAA.TONS OF DEATH, compiled by the Office of General Counsel,European Headquarters, American Joint Distribution Committee, Paris (1949)(hereafter cited as EUROPEAN LEGIsLATioN).
16 Law No. 20 of Feb. 16, 1883; Law of July 4, 1939, (1939) I REicHs-
GESETZBLATr 1186. See SABADITScH, DIE GESETZGEBUNG UEBER VERSCHOULLN-
HEiT. TODESERKLAERUNG UND BEWEISFUEHRUNG DES TODES (1946).
17 Decree of Oct. 27, 1945, (1945) CESKOSLOVENSKY ZAKONNIK No. 117.
The international relations of the problem are dealt with by Law of March
11, 1948 (Code on International Private Law), published in the April 10, 1948,
copy of CESKOSLOWENSKY ZAKONNIK (Act No. 41).18 Lav of April 23, 1901. Law No. 844 of Oct. 29, 1943. Law No. 752
of July 27, 1945. For full texts, see EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 53-60. See fur-
ther 1 SCHLEGELBERGER, DAS ZIVILRECHT DER NoRDIscHEN LAENDER 28 (1933).19 BUERGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH §§ 13-20; 1 STROHAL, PLANc 'S KOmMENTAR
zuim BUERGER.ICHEN GESETZBUCH 54 (1923); Law of July 4, 1939, (1939)
I REIcHSGESETZBLATr 1186. After World War II this law was amended in
the states of the British Zone (Dec. 16, 1946), of the French Zone (Feb.-
April, 1947) and of the U. S. Zone (Oct.-Dec., 1947). See EUROPEAN LESis-
LATION 89-92. The situation in the Eastern Zone of Germany was more con-
fused, since the courts there felt that the period of absence required to precede
a declaration of death by Law of July 4, 1939, Section'4, had not yet begun
to run and that consequently any application for a declaration of death would
be premature. However, with Decree No. 15 of March 9, 1949, (1949)
ZENTRALVERORD-NUNGSBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN JUSTIZVERWALTUNG 124, "any par-
ticipant of the war started by the Hitler-Government in 1939" and also any
civilian with the German armed forces may be declared dead from August 1,
1949. See VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 66-67.
20 Legislative Decree A69 of April 17/18, 1948.
21 Civil Practice Act (Act 1911 :1) §§ 732-747.; Government Orders, cited
supra note 13.
22 Three decrees on the substantive and adjective law of the problem, Nos.
40, 48 and 54, all of August 29, 1945, published in No. 40 (Oct. 6, 1945) of
DziENNIK USTAW RZECZYPOSrOLrIx J POLSKrEJ. For a discussion of the
Polish law on the subject, see Szabad and Blum, Proving Death of Victims
of Nazi Oppression, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 577, 585-586 (1949).
23 Civil Code Arts. 346-348.
24 Enactment No. 173, Decree-Law concerning the Declarations of the Pre-
sumed Death of Missing Persons of March 4, 1941, (1941) MoNiToRUL OFICIAL
No. 53, amended by Decree-Law No. 293 of May 26, 1944, (1944) MONIToRUL
OFICIAL No. 121; Enactment No. 598 of Aug. 3, 1946, concerning Declarations
of Death in Respect of Certain Categories of Missing Persons; Enactment
No. 50 of Feb. 27, 1948, concerning Succession to the Estates of Persons De-
ceased in Exceptional Circumstances.
25 Civil Code ch. 8, §§ 1-7. See 1 SCHLEGELBERGER, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 28.
26 Law of April 1, 1946, Art. 53. See EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 179.
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ifications in Bulgaria,27 and Switzerland.2 8 China, Japan, and Ice-
land are also reported to have adopted the concept.29
3. The system of declarations of absence does not go so far as
the system of a special and final declaration of death. In countries
adhering to the system of declarations of absence, an absentee is not
declared dead. However, under certain circumstances of disappear-
ance and after a certain period of absence, special proceedings may
be instituted with the sole purpose of obtaining a declaration of
absence. Such declaration, while not generally depriving the absen-
tee of his legal capacity, limits such capacity to a certain extent. It
generally does not affect his personal status (e.g. marriage), but it
does affect his property rights, and his assets are distributed upon
such declaration as if he had died. The essence of such a decision
is not to establish any presumption of death or survival. It leaves
the question of life or death open, but it allows certain steps to be
taken within the laws of property and inheritance, in the same man-
ner as if the absentee were dead, or, at least, it gives the presumptive
heirs provisional possession of his assets.30
The countries adhering to this system are Belgium,
31 France,3 2
27 Law of March 12, 1926 (1926) Official Gazette, March 17-applicable to
victims of World War I. Extended to victims of World War II by resolu-
tions of the Bulgarian Government of March 2 and 17, 1944, and Sept. 19,
1945 (Official Gazette of May 17 and Oct. 12, 1944, Nos. 101 and 224, and
Sept. 28, 1945, No. 226).
28 Civil Code Arts. 32, 35-38, providing for declarations of absence only,
such declarations having the effect of a declaration of death, however, as re-
gards the termination of a marriage (Civil Code Art. 102).
29 See VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 85, 178. The present writer had
no opportunity to check the laws of the last named three countries from pri-
mary sources.30 However, in view of the mass disappearances during World War II,
some of the jurisdictions following this system have enacted auxiliary statutes
on special and final declarations of death with effects limited to the absentees
of that war.
21 In this respect Belgian law closely follows the French law (see infra
note 32). The Law of Aug. 20, 1948, (1948) MONITEm BELGE of Aug. 27,
however, provides for possibility of declarations of death that are "equivalent
to civil status documents" (Art. 7), such declarations being restricted to the
cases of persons who disappeared between May 10, 1940 and Dec. 31, 1945.
32 CODE Civm Arts. 112-143 provide for a declaration of absenLe after four
years from the moment the missing person was last heard of, with the effect
of permitting provisional possession of the property by the presumptive heirs;
such provisional possession maturing into final ownership after 30 years of
absence or at the time the absentee attains the age of 100 years (Arts. 115, 120,
129). See 1 PLANIOL, TrrAIT ELEmENTAIrE DE DROIT CIVIL 219, 347-348
(1915). However, with regard to certain victims of World War II, France
seems to have adopted a mixed system and permits an application for declara-
tion of death four years after the declaration of absence. Law of Sept. 22,
1942, amended by Ordinance of April 5, 1944. Ordinance No. 45/256 of Oct.
30, 1945. Law No. 46/855 of April 30, 1946, amending Arts. 87-92 of the
CODE CivIL empowers the competent departments of the French Government
to issue declarations of death having "the same effect as a personal status
1950]
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Israel,33 Luxemburg,34 Netherlands,3 5 Norway,36 and with some
qualifications, Spain.ST It further seems that this system is in oper-
ation in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and in some countries in
Central and South America.3 8
4. The mixed system. This system embraces elements of both
the system of final declaration of death and the system of declarations
of absence. It provides for a declaration of absence as well as a
declaration of death, both considered as basic institutions, so that the
one is not auxiliary to the other, as is the case in some countries
discussed under the former systems.
There are but a few countries which have adopted this mixed
system. In such countries declarations of absence may be issued with
effect on property rights if certain requirements are met, and decla-
rations of death may be issued if certain other statutory requirements
are met. As a rule, a declaration of death is not contingent upon a
previous declaration of absence. The countries adopting this system
are Denmark,3 9 Italy,40 and the U. S. S. R.41
document" for those having supposedly died, but for whom for some reason
(probably the lack of data) no death certificate can be issued.
33 See Hanemann-Strauss, The Recognition of Foreign Declarations of
Death in the State of Israel, EUROPEAN LFisI.AnoN 183-185.
34 Luxemburg, however, a country generally adhering to the French CODE
CIVIL sytem, allowed declarations of death of war victims who may be sup-
posed to have died between May 10, 1940 and Dec. 31, 1945. The new provi-
sions resemble the concept of the system of special and final declarations of
death.
35 Netherlands, having formerly dealt rather cautiously with the problem
(Civil Code Arts. 50-73, 523-527), have adopted a more liberal viewpoint in re-
gard to victims of World War I and II. Laws of March 26 and Dec. 4, 1920,
(1920) STAATSBLAD Nos. 148, 864, and Law of June 29, 1925, (1925) STAATS-
BLAD No. 309. The same approach was adopted as to persons who left their
residence between May 9, 1940 and June 1, 1945. Law of June 2, 1949, (1949)
STAATSBLAD No. J 227.
36 Law of Oct. 12, 1857. As to persons who disappeared between April 9,
1940 and Dec. 31, 1945, broader provisions resembling special and final dec-
larations of death. Act No. 2 of Oct. 10, 1947.
37 Civil Code Arts. 193-197: declaration of death not extending to the per-
sonal status of the absentee.
3s See VOGEL, op. cit. .rupra note 14, at 86, 178-179. The present writer
had no opportunity to check the laws of the last named countries from primary
sources.
39 Missing Persons Act, No. 397, of July 12, 1946, with special provisions
for preliminary distribution of the estate even before declaration of death.§§ 16-24.
40 Civil Code §§ 48-68. Period of two years for a declaration of absence,
independent of proceedings for a declaration of death. According to private
information received by the writer, a bill dealing solely with the declarations
of death of children has recently been introduced in the Italian Parliament.
41 Civil Code Art. 12 (1948). Period of one year for declaration of ab-
sence; period of three years (six months in case of military operations or of
an accident) for a declaration of death. See also VOGEL, op. cit. stepra note 14.
at 86, 179; FREUND, DAS ZIVILRECHT IN DER SOWJETUNION 65-67 (1927);
MAKLEZOW, DAs RECHT SOWIETRUSSLANDs 258, 356 et seq. (1925).
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III. Problems Arising in Cases Involving an International Element
The systems outlined above also present other differences. The
reasons for such great variety probably lie in the fact that a declara-
tion of death necessarily has a primary effect on marriage and inheri-
tance, two relationships which for historical reasons are perhaps more
deeply rooted in national history than any others. The treatment of
these problems is beyond the scope of this discussion.
There are, however, difficulties in this legal field, which can
possibly be solved on a broad international basis. There is little hope
of achieving the unification of the principles governing the effects of
declarations of death in all national laws. But an attempt at unify-
ing certain procedural requirements and principles applicable to cases
in which international relationships are involved, would appear to be
within the realm of practical politics.
As regards this latter problem, the initial questions involved are
(1) how is an application for the declaration of death of an alien
treated in domestic law, and (2) what faith and credit is given to a
declaration of death issued abroad. The latter problem comprises a
number of further questions: does country A recognize a declaration
of death issued in country B if the missing person was a national of
country A? A national of country B? A national of country C?
A stateless person? These questions may be further complicated
according to the type of legal interest the missing person held in
country A.
With regard to declaring aliens dead, a number of countries
adhere to the principle of nationality. In these countries an alien
cannot, except under very exceptional circumstances, be declared
dead. Among the countries which were faced with the problem of
declarations of death of missing persons on a particularly large
scale, yet whose laws restricted declarations of death to their own
nationals, are Austria,42 Czechoslovakia,43 Finland,44 and France.45
Other countries base jurisdiction not, or not solely, on the missing
person's nationality, but on his last residence. This principle is
42 § 12 of Law of July 4, 1939, (1939) I REICHSGESETZBLATT 1186 (see
supra note 16), with qualifications in case the foreigner had a spouse who
was a former Austrian national, or if he had property situate in Austria, or
legal relations governed by Austrian law.
43 With some qualifications, Law No. 41 ofi Private International Law of
March 11, 1948, published on April 10, 1948 (see supra note 17), §§ 3-6.
44 § 1 of Law of April 23, 1901 (see supra note 18), supplemented to in-
clude foreigners having served with the Finnish armed forces by §§ 1, 4 of Law
No. 752 of July 27, 1945.
45 Ordinance No. 45/256 of Oct. 30, 1945 (see supra note 32), as amended
by Law No. 46/855 of April 30, 1946. 5 of Art. 88 of the CODE CIvIL as
amended by Art. 1 of Law No. 45/256 of Oct. 30, 1945, permits the issuance
by administrative authorities of a death certificate in the case of an alien who
disappeared in French territory. This provision is liberally construed: In re
Nussbaum, Tribunal Civil de Seine, April 25, 1947.
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adopted in the common law system and, outside the common law
area, in Belgium,46 Denmark,47 and Norway 48 among others. The
picture does not become clearer if we consider the various qualifica-
tions by which the basic concepts are modified in the national laws.
As an illustration: a national of country A, whose last residence was
in country B, disappears while serving with the armed forces of
country C in country D. He has property situated in country E and
a surviving heir in country F. It is a matter of pure chance whether
none of the countries A-F, or some, or all of them have jurisdiction
to declare the man dead. And there is a further problem, that of
ascertaining the national law which the court should apply. Even
in those countries whose national laws admit of declarations of death
of aliens, it may depend on purely fortuitous circumstances whether
the application for a declaration of death is granted or dismissed.
It may well happen that proceedings instituted simultaneously in
different countries will end in a declaration of death in one and a
refusal to make such declaration in another. Again, the positive
decisions rendered in different countries may establish different times
of death. Considerable confusion and duplication may of course arise
from such a situation.4"
Another urgent problem of international importance is that of
the recognition of a foreign declaration of death in another country.
In the case of the illustration given above the following question
arises. Let us assume that one of the countries A-F, exercising its
jurisdiction, has issued a declaration of death of the missing person.
Various interests may require that the countries originally concerned,
or even other countries, recognize such declaration of death as a
document establishing the death of such missing person. But will
they? There are countries which will under no circumstances recog-
nize a declaration of death of their own national issued by a foreign
court (e.g. Austria, 50 Hungary, 51 Italy 52). Other countries leave
46 Art. 1 of Law of Aug. 20, 1948 (see supra note 31). Belgian nationality
or residence in Belgium at the time of disappearance establish the jurisdiction
of Belgian courts.
47 § 8 of the Missing Persons Act (see supra, note 39) : jurisdiction based
on last permanent residence, or in the absence thereof on last residence in
Denmark with qualifications not here pertinent.
48 See Helweg, Note, EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 150.
49 Complications are further increased in the case of stateless persons for
certain national laws are reluctant to declare such persons dead. It would seem
that stateless persons were particularly affected by the problem under discus-
sion during and after World War II. The number of such persons seems to
have multiplied in the last decade due to more or less voluntary emigration
coupled with measures of expatriation. See Weis, Preface, EUROPEAN LzcIs-
LATioN 7, 8.
50 See Sokal, Note, EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 20.
5 § 735 Civil Practice Act (1911:J) (see supra note 21). For construc-
tion of the rule, see Note by the present writer, EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 120-
122.
52 See EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 120.
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the matter to the discretion of the trial court (e.g. Belgium,5 3 Lux-
emburg 54). In many countries the problem is still under discussion
(e.g. England,l5 Netherlands,5 6 Rumania,57 Switzerland 58).
It seems that among the jurisdictions of this country, it has been
mainly, if not exclusively, the New York courts that have been
called upon to deal with declarations of death involving a foreign
element. Prior to World War II a declaration of death issued by a
German court was admitted in evidence. 59 After World War II the
courts, dealing with two different cases involving Latvian nationals
who had been deported from Latvia (probably to Siberia) in June
1941, applied Latvian law and held that the circumstances attending
the deportation and the time that had since elapsed (3 years) con-
stituted circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant the assumption
that the deportees had died in the meantime. 60 Two other cases were
concerned with persons deported from France to extermination
camps in eastern Europe. The courts, having taken judicial notice
of the treatment which the Third Reich, prompted by racial preju-
dice, accorded to persons in concentration camps, received in evidence
certificates of presumed death issued by the French authorities, with-
out, however, deeming them to be conclusive evidence of death. 61 In
another case a Czechoslovak declaration of death was received in
evidence. 62
The Court of Appeals of the State of New York passed upon
the problem in the case of Goldstein v. National City Bank.63 Adopt-
C3 Arts. 8, 13 of Law of Aug. 20, 1948 (see supra notes 31 and 46).
54 See Bonn, Note, EuRoPEA&N LEGoIsLATir 134.5 For a discussion of the recognition of foreign declarations of death in
England, see Breslauer, Foreign Presumptions and Declarations of Death and
English Private International Law, 10 MOD. L. REv. 122 (1947).
56 See Karlsberg, Note, EUROPEAN LEaIsLATioN 143-144.
57 See Schwefelberg, Note, EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 169.
58 See Schnitzer, Note, EUROPEAN LEGISLA N 176.
69 Matter of Bellmer, 144 Misc. 462, 258 N. Y. Supp. 964 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
60 Matter of Jansons, 189 Misc. 554, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 685 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ;
Matter of Gauds, 189 Misc. 861, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
01 Matter of Elias, 189 Misc. 279, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 856 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ;
Matter of Magre, 189 Misc. 246, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 467 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
62 Matter of Halberstadt, 121 N. Y. L. J. 1330, col. 1 (Surr. Ct. April
13, 1949). Other cases involving disappearances in Europe in World War II:
(disappearance in Germany) Matter of Dieudonn6, 186 Misc. 642, 53 N. Y. S.
2d 840 (Surr. Ct. 1945); (disappearances in Poland) Matter of Rubinsztajn,
121 N. Y. L. J. 1616, col. 3 (Surr. Ct. May 5, 1949); Matter of Altman, 117
N. Y. L. J. 1570, col. 2 (Surr. Ct. April 22, 1947); Matter of Weitz, 69
N. Y. S. 2d 840 (Surr. Ct. 1944) ; Matter of Zalewski, 177 Misc. 384, 385-386,
30 N. Y. S. 2d 658, 661 (Surr. Ct. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 292 N. Y.
332, 55 N. E. 2d 184 (1944) (". . . terrible occurrences which have transpired
in Poland and particularly in Warsaw in recent times, ... may well be viewed
as weakening the inference of the probability of the continued life of a person
there resident."). A Maryland case (disappearance in Poland) : Lachowicz v.
Lechowicz, 181 Md. 478, 30 A. 2d 793 (1943), discussed in Comment, Statutory
Solution of Uncertainty as to Fact and Time of Death, 7 MD. L. Rav. 330
(1943).
63299 N. Y. 43, 48, 85 N. E. 2d 425, 426 (1949).
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ing a less liberal view than was taken in the decisions of the lower
courts referred to above, the Court of Appeals held that a Dutch
decree directing the recording of a document which certified that
the missing person had died in a concentration camp in Poland, was
insufficient proof of death.64
Cases involving a foreign element became frequent during and
after World War II. The complexities which stemmed from such
cases soon gave rise to the need for some analysis of the subject.
IV. International Action Prior to the Convention 65
The Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee
Organization (PCIRO), on May 9, 1948 in Geneva during the sixth
part of its first session, adopted a resolution on action with a view
to the international coordination of procedure for declarations of
death.
In a communication to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations dated June 3, 1948, the Executive-Secretary of the PCIRO
requested that the item "Action for the solution of legal difficulties
arising from the absence, due to war events or persecution, of per-
sons whose death cannot be conclusively established" be placed on
the agenda of the seventh session of the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations (ECOSOC).66 This communication was ac-
companied by a memorandum discussing the reasons and emphasizing
the importance of international cooperation on the problem.
The ECOSOC considered the question at its seventh session in
July-August, 1948. Since, as pointed out above, the initial step was
taken by the PCIRO, the representative of the United States felt
it necessary during this session to emphasize that the problem was
not limited to refugees, but affected the relatives of all those who
disappeared during the war. The majority having agreed on the
necessity of international action, the ECOSOC adopted a resolution
64 The daughter and administratrix of the missing person brought 'discovery
proceedings against the defendant bank. The Court of Appeals emphasized the
possibility of the reappearance of the absentee and followed Scott v. McNeal,
154 U. S. 34 (1894), where it was held that the distribution of the property
of an absentee became unconstitutional upon his reappearance, he having been
deprived of his property without due process of law. A subsequent decision
of the United States Supreme Court, Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198
U. S. 458 (1905), held that a statute providing for such distribution was not
unconstitutional if it provided for notice to and protection for the absentee.
See also note 4 supra. In the Goldstein case the Court of Appeals held that if
the absentee was alive he had no notice of the discovery proceeding. For a
discussion of Goldstein v. National City Bank, see Szabad and Blum, supra
note 22, at 589-591.
65 For a history of developments up to Feb., 1950, see Background Paper No.
56, ST/DPI/Ser. A/56, published by the U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information,
Research Section (Feb. 22, 1950).
66 E/824.
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on August 24, 1948,67 which recognized that the problem was urgent
and might best be solved by an international convention. It requested
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a draft con-
vention in collaboration with the PCIRO 68 and the other competent
organizations.
Complying with this request, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, after consultation with the competent organizations prepared
a draft convention and transmitted it to member governments for
comment on October 20, 1948.69
The ECOSOC, at its eighth session adopted an amended pro-
posal of the United Kingdom 70 which called for the establishment
of an ad hoc committee composed of seven members of the United
Nations. This ad hoc committee was to study the draft convention
prepared by the Secretary-General and to prepare a draft convention
or to draft any other proposals in case it did not consider the drafting
of a convention practicable. This committee 71 met at Geneva from
June 7 to June 21, 1949 and prepared a draft for submission to the
ECOSOC at its ninth session.72
The ECOSOC at its ninth session considered the report of the
ad hoc committee. On August 9, 1949, it adopted a resolution 73
recognizing the urgency of the problem and requesting the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to transmit the draft convention and
other material to member governments immediately. The General
Assembly was advised to consider the draft convention during its
fourth session.
The sLxth committee of the General Assembly (fourth session),
stressing the importance of internal measures in the national laws,
prepared a report, which was considered by the General Assembly
on December 3, 1949. The representative of Denmark felt that the
report of the sLxth committee was not adequate and submitted a pro-
posal, which called for an international conference. This proposal,
together with the amended draft resolution, was adopted by twenty-
nine votes to one with fifteen abstentions. The resolution called for
an international conference of the representatives of governments to
be held not later than April 1, 1950, with a view to concluding a
multilateral convention on the subject.74 The draft convention was
referred to member states and upon the instructions received by the
67 No. 158/'VII, E/1029 (Aug. 26, 1948).
68 Which on Aug. 20, 1948, became the International Refugee Organization
(IRO).OG E/1071 (Oct. 26, 1948).7
°209(VIII) (March 2, 1949).
71 Composed of representatives of Brazil, Denmark, France, Lebanon,
Poland, U.S.S.R. and United States.
72 E/1369, E/Ac 30/47 (June 21, 1949).
73249(IX). See note by the Secretary-General of the U.N. A/999 (Sept.
27, 1949).74 369(IV) (Dec. 3, 1949).
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General Assembly the Secretary-General issued invitations to all
member governments to attend the Conference.
The Conference met at Lake Success from March 15 to April
6, 1950, and the governments of twenty-five states were represented
by delegations. 75 The governments of another six states 76 and the
IRO were represented by observers. During the three weeks the
Conference met eleven times 77 and a drafting committee appointed
by the Conference simultaneously held fifteen meetings. The result
of these deliberations was a Final Act 78 and the establishment of an
international Convention 7 on Declaration of Death of Missing
Persons, signed on April 6, 1950.
V. Analysis of the Convention on the Declaration of Death of
Missing Persons
The Convention, consisting of twenty articles, has two main
objectives: (1) to facilitate issuance of declarations of death of miss-
ing persons by affording a convenient choice of tribunals, and (2) to
provide for the recognition of declarations of death made under the
Convention by other states who are parties to the Convention.80
The main provisions of the Convention are as follows:
1. Effects of declarations of death. The basic idea of-the Con-
vention is that each contracting state is obligated to recognize decla-
rations of death of certain specified categories of missing persons
issued within the framework of the Convention in another contract-
ing state.8'
Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention establishes the degree
of such recognition. "Declarations of death issued in conformity
with the present Convention in one Contracting State shall constitute
in the other Contracting State prima facie evidence of death and the
75 Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, China, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, France,
Greece, India, Israel, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Sweden, Syria, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia.
76 Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico, Thailand. As it appears, neither
the U.S.S.R., nor the government of any other ountry of the Soviet bloc at-
tended the Conference, either as participants, or as observers. The representa-
tive of Poland, Byelorussian S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. consistently opposed
the conclusion of an international convention in the course of the preliminary
negotiations referred to above. For the attitude of Yugoslavia, see infra note
92.
,7Record of the Conference: A/Conf. 1/Sr. 1-11.
78 Signed by 21, out of 25, delegates present on April 6, 1950. Those not
present signed the Final Act later.
79 Accepted by 20 votes to 0, with one (Yugoslavia) abstention.
80 See Maktos, United Nations Conference on Declaration of Death of Miss-
ing Persons, 23 DEP'T STATE BULL 264, 266 (1950).
81 See NisoT, LA CONVENTION nu 6 Avaii 1950 CONCERNANT LA PREUVE DU
Dzczs DES PFRSOXNFs DISPARUES AU COURS DES ANNEES DE GuEREz 3 (1950).
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date of death until contrary evidence is submitted." This final text
of the Convention, in recognizing declarations of death as "prima
facie evidence" only,8 2 remains far behind the preliminary drafts,
with their much broader provisions.
The Convention sets no time limit for submitting contrary evi-
dence to rebut the effect of prima facie evidence accorded to the
declaration of death in the Convention. Such evidence may be pro-
duced at any time and may result first of all from the reappearance
of the absentee. In view of the rather limited effect of declarations
of death under the Convention, a special corrective provision is con-
tained in Article 5, paragraph 2, to the effect that the contracting
states may by special arrangement grant broader effects than those
provided for in paragraph 1 of the same article. This provision
would appear to represent the result of a compromise between two
conflicting positions: unqualified mutual recognition of the validity
of declarations of death on the one hand, and limited recognition of
their effects, as provided in the final text of the Convention, on the
other.83
2. Categories of missing persons under the Convention. The
Convention does not provide for a declaration of death system of
general international application. It does not affect every declaration
of death that may be issued by a contracting state. On the contrary,
it expressly limits its application to cases well-defined as to the time,
the place, the background, and the circumstances of disappearance.
Article 1, paragraph 1, states that the Convention provides for decla-
rations of death of those persons whose last residence was in Europe,
Asia or Africa, 84 and who have disappeared in the years 1939-1945,
".. . under circumstances affording reasonable ground to infer that
they have died in consequence of events of war or of racial, religious,
political or national persecution." (Art. 1, par. 1).
The representative of the United States pointed out at the Con-
ference, that he wanted it understood that the word "persecution" as
used in Article 1, paragraph 1, covers the idea of "mass persecution
82 Compare the French official version of the Convention "... font foi
jusqu'fi preuve du contraire. .. "
83 The Convention solves the problem in a cautious manner, by granting
foreign declarations of death recognition as prima facie evidence only, and de-
nying them the full effect of a domestic decree. The reasons that the Con-
vention did not go beyond this are to be found in the compromising tendency
governing the Conference, which aimed at the widest possible acceptance of
the Convention; in the differences existing between national laws,; and in the
problems inherent in the idea of a declaration of death itself. It seems that
in adopting this wording the Convention has created almost as many problems
as it has solved for by granting the effect of a prima facie evidence only, it
leaves the construction of the effect of a prima facie evidence entirely to the
national laws.
841 "... members of armed forces serving in Europe, Asia or Africa shall
not, by reason only of such service, be considered as having had their residence
in those continents." (Art. 1, 1).
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in a country." There was no opposition to this construction and it
was placed on the record.8 5
Article 1, paragraph 2, further provides that the contracting
states may, by notification to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, extend the application of the Convention to persons who
disappeared after 1945 under similar circumstances and that such
extension shall apply only as between those states which have made
such notification. It is obvious that the intention of this article is to
define with final effect the class of missing persons in whose cases
the provisions of the Convention shall apply. These limits seem to
be clear enough, at least as regards the criteria of last residence 86
and of the circumstances under which the persons concerned dis-
appeared.8 7 The time limits laid down by the Convention, however,
are less definite. Article 1, paragraph 1, merely applies to missing
persons who disappeared in the years 1939-1945, thus substantially
restricting the effect of the Convention to those who disappeared
during World War II; and since the summary wording "years
1939-1945" does not cover precisely the period of World War II,
the Convention apparently applies to all those who disappeared in
connection with the upheavals immediately preceding and immediately
following the war. This means that the Convention excludes from
its scope all people whose disappearance has no connection whatsoever
with political events (war, persecution), such as the victims of earth-
quakes, airplane crashes and shipwrecks outside the war areas. A
possibility of indefinite extension in time is implied in Article 1, para-
graph 2, with respect to cases of missing persons who disappeared
after 1945, though the practical effects of such extension appear to
be restricted (see also 10 "Duration" infra). No such extension is
provided for by the Convention in respect of persons who disappeared
prior to 1939, but such retroactive extension would in any case have
been in practice of very limited importance.
3. Authorities 'competent under the Convention to issue decla-
rations of death. Article 2 contains an exhaustive enumeration of
the tribunals which are competent ratione loci to issue declarations of
death. The article further provides that the term "tribunal" as used
in the Convention, shall apply ". . . to all authorities empowered
ratione nateriae to determine the fact of death under the governing
85 See Maktos, supra note 80, at 266.
86 Europe, Asia or Africa. The mere fact of service with armed forces on
these continents does not establish such residence. Consequently, United States
citizens cannot be affected by the Convention, unless their last residence has
been in one of these continents and, of course, unless they are involved not as
missing persons, but rather as applicants for declarations of death.
87 Circumstances affording reasonable ground to infer that death ensued in
consequence of events of war or of racial, religious, political or national perse-
cution-the last word (persecution) being understood as "mass persecution in
a country."
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domestic law." (Art. 2, par. 1).88 The tribunals that shall be com-
petent ratione loci are alternatively the tribunal of the place of the
last domicile of the missing person, or the tribunal of his last volun-
tary or involuntary 9 residence. Further alternative criteria upon
which the jurisdiction of the courts may be based are nationality,
situs of property, place of death, and place of domicile or residence
of the applicant.90 91
By Article 2, paragraph 4, "When an applicant has applied to a
tribunal considered by him as competent under the preceding
paragraphs of the present article, he shall not be entitled to make a
subsequent application to another tribunal unless he has withdrawn
his first application before judgment has been rendered or unless the
first tribunal does not regard itself as competent to deal with the
application." 92
4. Application for declaration of death. Article 3 rules that
any competent tribunal 93 must issue a declaration of death of a miss-
ing person, provided that the conditions of Article 1, paragraph 1
(see above) are met, provided that at least five years have elapsed
since the last known date on which the person was probably alive
and provided further that in the course of the proceedings public
notice, reasonably designed to afford the absentee an opportunity to
make known that he is alive, has been given. Article 3 further pro-
vides that proceedings may be instituted upon application of any
natural or juridical person having a legal interest in the matter,9" or
88 It seems that this definition covers not only judicial tribunals, but any
other, namely, administrative authorities of jurisdiction in the domestic law.
8 Involuntary residence: e.g., concentration camps, areas of deportation, etc.
90 Ascendants, descendants, adopted children and their issue, brothers, sis-
ters, and their issue, uncles, aunts, spouse. (Art. 2, 12.) It would seem that
the domicile or residence of the applicant is an unusual and heretofore unknown
basis for the competency of a tribunal in declaration of death matters. It
would mean that, e.g., a person deported from Denmark to Poland could be
declared dead upon application of a relative who happens to live in Pakistan,
by a Pakistani court. In addition to considerations of convenience, a reason
for such extension of the competency ratione loci seems to be the fact that
because of currency restrictions introduced throughout numerous countries, rela-
tives living in certain countries were by law forbidden to transmit the amounts
needed for declaration of death proceedings (attorney's fees, costs of search,
documents, etc.) to be introduced in another country.
91 Since under the Convention United States state courts would have been
competent and also obligated to issue declarations of death, the representative
of the United States, in order to avoid difficulties that might result from this
provision, suggested, that any contracting state should have the authority to
designate one or more tribunals to which the competence of issuing declarations
of death with respect to the preceding paragraph could be transferred. This
suggestion was accepted. (Art. 2, 3.)
92 An amendment of the Yugoslav representative, suggesting that certain
tribunals be given priority, was rejected by the Conference. Thereafter the
representative of the Yugoslav Government abstained from voting on the Con-
vention as a whole, but signed the Final Act of the Conference.
93 See Art. 2 discussed in 3 supra.
94 Art. 3, 2, contains an enumeration of legal interests within the meaning
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at the instance of an authority charged with the protection of the pub-
lic interest,9 5 or on the motion of a competent tribunal. 6
5. Date of death. "In issuing a declaration of death, the com-
petent tribunal shall determine the date and the time " of death,
taking into consideration any evidence or indication regarding the
circumstances or the period in which death occurred" (Art. 4, par.
1). In the absence of such evidence or indication, the date of death
shall be fixed at the date of disappearance (Art. 4, par. 2), which
shall be the date of the last known indication of the existence of the
missing person. Such last known indication shall be determined by
facts brought to the tribunal's attention and, in particular, by the
last news of the missing person (Art. 4, par. 3). If there is no
evidence regarding the time of death, it shall be declared to have
taken place at the last moment of the declared day of death (Art. 4,
par. 4).98
6. Declarations of death issued prior to the Convention. The
Convention naturally affects only such declarations of death as are
issued after it becomes operative. Under Article 6, however, if in
the territory of a contracting state a competent tribunal, having
issued a declaration of death prior to the Convention, certifies that
such declaration of death satisfies all the requirements of Articles 1-3
of the Convention, the declaration of death shall have the same
validity in the territory of the contracting states, as if it had been
issued under the Convention. It seems that the Conference did not
of this article: (a) interest in the missing person's estate, other than that of
a creditor; (b) interest (other than that of a creditor) in property the devo-lution or distribution of which may depend either on the survival or death or
on the date of death of the missing person; (c) personal status affected by
survival or death of the missing person; (d) desire to adopt the minor children
of the missing person. This last category (desire of adoption), although verypractical, seems to extend the concept of "legal interest" far beyond its normal
scope.
95 For instance, a competent department of the government96 This will not seem so unusual when it is recalled that, according to
Article 2, paragraph 1, administrative authorities may under certain circum-
stances become competent to issue declarations of death.
9 In the French version of the Convention: ". . . l'heure...
98 The draft convention of the ad hoc committee provided that in the ab-
sence of any other indication, the tribunal should establish as the date of death
the last day of the year, during which death probably occurred. This date,
however, should have no effect in causing the lapse of an insurance policy for
non-payment of premiums during that year. This special provision as to effects
on insurance policies was suggested by the representative of the United States
Government in order to avoid a forfeiture of insurance policies, which, in the
absence of special statutory amendments, could have occurred if the insured
person had disappeared in the course, and even at the beginning of a year, and
had discontinued the payment of premiums. This special provision concerning
insurance policies became superfluous and was eliminated, since under the final
text it is not the last day of the year but the date of disappearance which is
established as the date of death. See Maktos, srpra note 80, at 267.
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intend to withhold the benefits of the Convention from the very
numerous declarations of death that have been issued in many states
during, after and in connection with World War II.
There is no contradiction between the provisions of Article 6,
outlined above, and Article 7, which states that the Convention shall
not be construed as impairing the force or the res judicata status of
final declarations of death issued before the effective date of the Con-
vention.
7. International Bureau for Declarations of Death. Articles 8
and 15 provide for the establishment of an International Bureau for
Declarations of Death within the framework of the United Nations.
This Bureau shall also be entitled to receive from governments or
individuals authenticated copies of declarations of death of missing
persons, issued before the entry into force of the Convention. This
provision has nothing to do with the rule of Article 6 (applicability
of the Convention to previously issued declarations of death if
adequately certified), °9 since here there is no question of specially
certifying a previous declaration of death in order to bring it under
the provisions of the Convention. The purpose of the provision is
simply to increase the effectiveness of the Convention and to ensure
the efficient working of the Bureau by providing it with adequate
material, thus enabling it to be fully informed of all declarations of
death made in the different contracting states, and, finally, to elim-
inate duplication of proceedings.
Article 15 requires the approval of the General Assembly of the
United Nations to the establishment of the International Bureau. It
has been held that Articles 8 and 15 amount to an offer made by the
contracting states to the United Nations, asking for the latter's co-
operation in the establishment of the Bureau.10 0 The report of the
Secretary-General on the Convention is included as item 48 on the
agenda of the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, which
opened at Flushing Meadow on September 16, 1950, and it may be
that the question of the establishment of the Bureau will be raised
on that occasion.
8. Communication of applications. Any tribunal to which an
application for a declaration of death is made or which has initiated
such proceedings on its own motion (Art. 3, par. 1) shall within 15
days communicate to the Bureau the particulars of the application
as detailed in Article 9. These particulars include the missing per-
son's name, place and date of birth, habitual residence, last known
voluntary or involuntary residence, information as to nationality and
last known date of having been alive, names and addresses of the
closest relatives and of the applicant, the applicant's interest in and
99 See discussion under 6.
100 NiSOT, op. cit. mtpra note 84, at 7 n. 1.
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relationship, if any, to the missing person, and finally the date of
institution of the proceedings.
If the Bureau finds that proceedings are already pending before
another tribunal, it immediately will notify the tribunal to which the
later application has been made. Such tribunal is to suspend its
proceedings pending a final decision by the other tribunal, and is to
notify the tribunal to which the first application has been made about
the subsequent application (Art. 9, par. 2).
9. Publication and communication of decisions. A tribunal
issuing either a positive or a negative decision under the Convention
shall communicate it to the Bureau within 15 days from the date on
which such decision became final (Art. 10, par. 1). The Bureau
shall publish periodically lists of all applications, final decisions and
certifications (under Art. 6 101) which are communicated to it and
also declarations of death which it has received under Article 8,
paragraph 4.102 It shall also notify any close relatives whose names
have been communicated under Article 9, paragraph 1, of applica-
tions, decisions, and certifications. 10 3  Finally, the Bureau shall
transmit to any tribunal in which application has been filed for a
declaration of death the reasons for any previous denial of the decla-
ration of death of the same person by any other tribunal (Art. 10,
par. 2).
Article 10, paragraph 4, contains a provision corresponding to
Article 8, paragraph 4,104 and equally designed to insure an efficient
information service. According to this paragraph, if a final declara-
tion of death is under reconsideration in the country where it was
issued under the Convention, the application for reconsideration and
the decision which will be rendered thereon shall be subject to
Article 10, paragraphp 1 and 2.105 This provision applies also to cer-
tified cases under Article 6 (Art. 10, par. 4).
Another rule prohibits the issuance of a declaration of death
under the Convention until the expiration of three months from the
publication of the application by the Bureau (Art. 10, par. 3). This
provision is intended to provide a sufficient period of time for in-
terested persons to react to the publication.
10. Duration. The Convention shall be valid for a period of
five years from the date of its entry into force 10 6 (Art. 17, par. 1).
However, proceedings initiated during, but not concluded before, the
expiration of the validity of the Convention may be continued and
the effects of final decisions in such proceedings will be the same as
101 See discussion under 6.
102 See discussion under 7.
103 See discussion under 8.
104 See discussion under 7.
105 See preceding paragraphs of this discussion.
106 Which according to Art. 14 is the thirtieth day following the day of de-
posit of the second instrument of accession by any state (Art. 13).
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if they had been rendered before the expiration of the Convention
(Art. 17, par. 2).
11. National laws. Reservations. The Final Act of the United
Nations Conference on Declaration of Death of Missing Persons
contains this statement placed on record at the request of some
delegations: "All matters not specifically dealt with by the Conven-
tion including the question of reappearance of missing persons, re-
main within the domain of the domestic law of the Contracting
States; . . . ." This again shows with what respect national laws are
treated by the Convention. The same respect is manifested in the
rule under which any state may subject its accession to the Conven-
tion to reservations, which may be formulated only at the time of
accession (Art. 19). This seems a somewhat unusual clause. Its
wording is the result of an extensive debate concerning such reserva-
tions.10 7 If a contracting state does not accept such reservation, it
may, within 90 days after the Secretary-General of the United
Nations has transmitted the reservations to it, notify the Secretary-
General that it considers the accession not in force between itself and
the state having made the reservation (Art. 19).
12. Settlement of disputes. Disputes between the contracting
states relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention,
if not settled by other means, shall be referred to the International
Court of Justice (Art. 18). This provision is intended as an effective
guaranty against arbitrary interpretation on the part of any contract-
ing state and is a means of efficiently pursuing the solution of prac-
tical difficulties, which may arise in the course of the functioning of
the Convention." 8
13. Other provisions of the Convention deal with letters rog-
atory,10 9 with free legal aid and the exemption from costs, °0 with
the accession to the Convention,"' with notifications by the Secretary-
107 See Maktos, supra note 80, at 270.
10o See NISOT, op. cit. supra note 81, at 11.
lo9 Art. 11: relating to proceedings under the Convention in accordance with
domestic law and with agreements transmitted by usual methods or through the
Bureau.
110 Art. 12: granted to aliens only in the case of reciprocity, indigent appli-
cants are exempt from the requirement of posting security for costs which are
imposed on aliens alone.
I1I Art. 13: the Convention is open for accession by (a) member states of
the United Nations, (b) non-member states which are parties to the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, (c) other non-member states to which
an invitation has been addressed by the ECOSOC passing upon the request of
the state concerned. There was an exchange of opinions between the delegates
of Belgium, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States on the meaning
of the word "state" under the Convention, in view of the fact that the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom customarily consult with some of their overseas
territories before accepting international obligations on behalf of them. Finally
the amendment supported by the representative of the United States was
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General of the United Nations, which are required under the Conven-
tion, 12 and with the deposit of the Convention and the languages of
its authentic texts.1
3
VI. Summary: Significance of the Convention
Any attempt at evaluating the Convention as a whole must start
from the limitations it sets upon itself. In other words, in order
fully to appreciate what it includes, it is necessary to realize what it
excludes from its province. Some important restrictions have already
been pointed out in part V of the present note.
The Convention is limited in scope. It does not provide for a
uniform international system of declarations of death, nor did its
authors intend to lay the foundations for such a system. The Con-
vention merely facilitates certain types of applications for declarations
of death, and provides for some measure of extraterritorial effect of
such declarations. It does not apply to all factual circumstances that
may give rise to a declaration of death, but is restricted to cases that
have a political background (warlike events or mass persecution).
The Convention is limited in effect. It does not afford full extra-
territorial effect to declarations of death made under it, but merely
provides for their recognition as prima facie evidence.
The Convention covers a limited period of time. It is primarily
applicable to cases of disappearance during World War II. And
here, it may have come too late, large numbers of such cases having
already been passed upon by the courts of various countries. More-
over, the Convention shall be valid for five years only.
Finally, the Convention has a limited area of operation. On the
one hand, it applies only to cases of disappearance in Europe, Asia
and Africa. On the other hand, it excludes in practice all states not
members of the United Nations or not within the categories of
Article 13 (see note 111). Hence it tends to exclude from its
operation the states defeated in World War II (which are, of course,
the countries most concerned in the matter) and some states that
were neutral during World War II. In addition, the Convention
does not, of course, operate in the states that are not parties to it.
We are thus faced' with a Convention of limited scope and
effects. As pointed out above, the Conference felt that were the
scope of the Convention too broad, the chances of adoption by many
governments would be reduced.
adopted, according to which the word "state" under the Convention includes
all the territories for which a contracting state bears international responsi-
bility, unless such state on acceding to the Convention has stipulated that the
Convention should not apply to certain of its territories, the contracting parties
having the right to cancel partly or entirely such stipulation.
112 Art. 16.
31 Art. 20.
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In spite of this the Convention may be regarded as a document
of considerable practical and moral significance.
As to its practical value: despite the limitations listed above, it
is estimated that there still remain a considerable number of cases
in which the Convention will serve as the sole means of attaining
the ends of justice. There are still many people who can benefit by
the Convention, and it will enable them to solve long-delayed prob-
lems of marriage, adoption, and property.
The theoretical significance and moral value of the Convention
is still greater. The Conference which adopted the Convention was
the first conference of states called by the General Assembly of the
United Nations itself, and the Convention was the first within the
framework of the United Nations, the subject of which did not fit
into the customary classifications of United Nations' problems. The
declaration of death of missing persons would appear to be strictly
a problem in private law.'1 4
The Convention thus constitutes a first step in various direc-
tions. Such first steps may sometimes have but a limited practical
value: their true importance lies in the fact of their being first steps.
In this regard the Convention certainly possesses a far-reaching
moral value. It is a moral tribute paid by the United Nations and
its member states to the victims of hatred and misery, of slave labor,
mass killing and extermination. Looked at from this angle, the
Convention is a grim reminder of the unparalleled tragedies of
modern warfare and of political bias and prejudice. In order to help
survivors of the millions who disappeared in World War II, at least
some measure of international cooperation has been reached in the
Convention. Doubtless this is a step forward sincerely to be wel-
comed.
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